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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





" CASE NO, 14456 
ROBERT EARL HAMILTON, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS, 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant brought this action seeking a decree quieting title in appellant to either, (1) a 
Vi undivided interest in the subject real property, or (2) an undivided Vs interest in the 
subject real property. Respondents Poulsen defended as a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of appellant's claims. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was submitted to the Court by both parties on Motions for Summary 
Judgment with depositions and transcripts of trial submitted as affidavits. The District 
Court for the Fifth Judicial District in Millard County, the Honorable J. Harland Burns 
presiding, entered its judgment decreeing respondent George Poulsen to be the owner of the 
subject real property and quieting title in his name and against appellant. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court vacating the judgment rendered by the trial 
court and remanding the case for further proceedings, and Respondents seek affirmation of 
the judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The property involved is northwest of Delta, Utah and was acquired on November 22, 
1967 in the name of Robert Earl Hamilton, appellant's former husband (N-33). Title never 
was in her name, no homestead filing was ever made and no lis pendens relating to the 
divorce proceedings was ever filed by appellant. The purchase price of the property had 
been paid by Mr. Hamilton's father. 
The appellant was married to the defendant Robert Earl Hamilton in November of 
1964 in Las Vegas, Nevada. (T [1975] 3:18) (D 3:16). From approximately October, 1965 
through April, 1968, the Hamiltons resided in California (D 3:17-20). In the Spring of 1968 
the Hamilton family moved from California to Millard County, Utah (T [1973] 4:11-15) 
where they resided on the subject real property for approximately 13 months until the 
appellant returned to California in May of 1969. (T [1973] 4:16-20). 
In Civil No. 5843 in Millard County (T [1969]) the appellant pursued a divorce action 
against the defendant Robert Earl Hamilton. The complaint in said action was filed on May 
28, 1969 (T ']1975] 3:18-19) and the hearing on the case was held before the Honorable 
James P. McCune on December 8, 1969, (T [1975] 3:2;-21). The court found that the 
appellant was entitled to an interlocutory decree of divorce and orally granted such decree 
of divorce to her (T [1969] 32:9-16). The Court stated further that the decree would be final 
in all respects except as to the real property, including the water stock and equipment that 
goes with the farm itself (T [1975] 4:9-12 and T [1969] 38:25-30). The actual interlocutory 
decree of divorce was not signed and filed by Judge McCune until April 16, 1970 (T [1975] 
5:11-14), which decree purported to require that the real property here involved and 
including other real property owned by the parties and 50 shares of water " should remain in 
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joint ownership as tenants in common until the Court, by further order, directs distribution 
or division of said property." (T [1975] 5:19-29). 
On March 13, 1970 (D 317-19) during the time the final division of the real property 
was pending, the defendant Robert Earl Hamilton, representing himself to be "a single 
man" (D 6:18-19, 10: 17-21) conveyed by Warranty Deed to George J. Poulsen the real 
property involved in this litigation (T [1975] 4:22-25). The Warranty Deed was duly 
acknowledged by Robert E. Hamilton as a single man before Rodney Adams, a Notary 
Public, at Fillmore, Utah, and was recorded in the office of the Millard County Recorder's 
Office on March 31, 1970 in Book 77 at page 519 (T [1975] 5:15-16). Since that time the 
respondent George Poulsen has held title to and has claimed possession of said property. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the trial court, Judge Burns (T 45 to T 
49) determined that respondent George Poulsen had no prior notice of the claimed interest 
of appellant, paid approximately $12,000.00 for it, no award had been made in the divorce 
proceedings prior to the sale, and that appellant is not the widow of the vendor, Robert E. 
Hamilton. Appellant is divorced from Robert E. Hamilton and has no right, title or interest 
in the property. Judgment was so entered December 30, 1975. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT IS NOT THE WIDOW OF FORMER HUSBAND-OWNER 
(VENDOR) AND HENCE HAS NO INTEREST IN REALTY OF DIVORCED 
HUSBAND SOLD TO RESPONDENT POULSEN. 
Appellant asserts a one-third ''dower'' or statutory interest in the realty. This is 
claimed as a result of the language of Section 74-4-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
There are a number of problems that confront the appellant in order to be successful in 
this type proceeding. The first is that as identified, it is not a "dower" right, but a statutory 
interest, which does not come into existence until after the husband's demise. The language 
of Section 74-4-3, U.C.A. 1953, is "one-third in value of all of the legal or equitable estates 
in real property possessed by the husband at any time during the marriage, to which the wife 
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be set apart as her property in fee simple, // Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
she survives him;99 (underscoring ours). At no place is it asserted that Mr. Hamilton is 
deceased, and hence she is not entitled to a share in the realty. The interest which she asserts 
is under a section of the statutes, the title being ''Successions", and relates to the potential 
right of a widow in the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased husband. Absent 
the condition precedent to the whole theory of her case, namely that her husband is 
deceased, she has no interest which can be asserted. No proof was adduced that Robert E. 
Hamilton is dead. 
State of Utah v. Davis, et al, 17 Utah 2d 38, 395 P.2d 277, involved the position 
asserted by transferees of a married woman claiming an interest in the property in the 
condemnation proceedings. The court held that such was not a valid basis, and stated: 
The contention that appellants had a dower interest in the property by 
virtue of a transfer by a married woman, whose inchoate dower interest 
had not vested, is without merit. 
This seems to lay at rest any possible contention the plaintiff might have in this case 
she has an interest in the property when the potential interest was inchoate only at the time 
of the divorce. She is now a divorced woman and could not possibly recover the one-third 
interest if Mr. Hamilton were to die at this time, as she would not be his widow and would 
not have any of his statutory or common law dower rights to the property. 
This issue generally has been considered by your Court and clearly decided that the 
wife's statutory one-third interest is conditioned upon her surviving the husband. Gee v. 
Baum, 58 Utah 445, 199 Pac. 680. At p. 603 the decision reads: 
While it is true that under our statute dower by the name is abolished 
and the wife takes one-third of her husband's real estate in fee if she 
survives him, yet, unless she does survive him, she has no interest in his 
real estate. The interest of the wife, although in fee, is nevertheless, a mere 
inchoate interest, and depends entirely upon the condition that she survive 
her husband. 
Appellant cites two cases to overcome the obvious problem, namely, that appellant was 
not and is not the widow or her former husband, who was the fee title holder of the real 
property. These both involve estate issues after the death of the husband-owner. The quote 
from In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P. 2d 595 (603) truly reflects the law relating 
to Mr. Madsen's widow. Had she not joined in a conveyance made during coverture, the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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legal title might be "encumbered by dower" unless she has joined in the conveyance or 
estopped herself from asserting such statutory interest. The right considered by the Court 
was the interest of the widow, and even that could be lost by estoppel or conveyance. The 
Hilton v. Sloan case cited, 37 Utah 359, 108 Pac. 689, is very similar. The widow had 
estopped herself from asserting title to the one-third interest. 
In our present case, appellant is not the widow of respondent Poulsen's grantor. 
Rather, she elected to seek and ultimately procured a divorce from Robert E. Hamilton. 
Section 73-4-3 of the Probate Code does not embrace "grass widows" in its benefits. In 
consequence, appellant is not entitled to claim a one-third interest in her former husband's 
realty. During the term of the marriage, appellant did not file or claim a homestead right in 
and to the realty in Utah. 
The trial court properly held that on the basis of the statute and the facts in this case, 
appellant had not proven any right, title or interest in the realty purchased in good faith and 
for valuable consideration by respondent George Poulsen, believeing that at the time of the 
sale Mr. Hamilton was a "single man." Appellant did not become his widow during the 
period of the marriage, nor prior to the finalityof the divorce. The one-third "dower" was 
merely inchoate and now has uterly disappeared by reason of the divorce. 
POINT II 
DIVORCE DECREE SUBSEQUENT TO HUSBAND'S SALE OF REALTY 
AND WITHOUT LIS PENDENS CANNOT AFFECT TITLE TO BONA 
FIDE, INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE FROM HUSBAND. 
To evaluate this phase of appellant's case, it may be helpful to schedule the events 
which are relevant: 
Hamiltons were married in Nevada - 1964 
Hamiltons resided in California, October, 1965 to April, 1968 
Nov. 22, 1967 - Utah realty in question (plus other land and water) was 
purchased by Mr. Hamilton's father and title taken in the name of Robert 
E. Hamilton 
Spring, 1968 - Hamiltons moved to property in Millard County. 
May, 1969 - divorce action filed by appellant in Civil No. 5845 - no lis pendens, 
and she returned to California. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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December 8, 1969 - trial in divorce and divorce granted to appellant - court 
said that such would be final as to custody of children, names, support, etc., 
but as to the property the trial court first said that it was not "in a position 
to decide the matter of peroprty rights until we have definite evidence . . . 
documentary evidence and something definite and certain submitted to 
the court . . . " (X-lll) Later the court acquiesced in counsel for the parties 
seeking a compromise property settlement. 
March 11, 1970, Warranty Deed by Robert E. Hamilton, "a single man" to 
George J. Poulsen, recorded March 31, 1970. 
April 14, 1970 - Decree of Divorce. 
The delay in the preparation of the actual Findings and Divorce Decree (hearing 
December 8, 1969 and Degree signed April 14, 1970) may have resulted from extended 
negotiations between appellant and her husband or between counsel. In the meantime, 
appellant had packed up and gone back to California. The court's expressions in December 
were that substantial evidence should be produced to guide him in fixing or approving a 
property settlement between the parties. 
More than three months passed after the court had declared that a final divorce was 
being granted to appellant. Then, appellant's husband, apparently believing that the divorce 
had been granted and that the decree was final, approached respondent, George Poulsen, 
and offered to sell the land to him. In response to Mr. Poulsen's inquiry, Mr. Hamilton 
representated that he was divorced and now a single man. In the warranty deed on March 
13, 1970, he represented himself to be a single man and so declared himself in the 
acknowledgment before the notary public. At that time appellant was in California and had 
been since May 1969 and Mr. Hamilton was residing alone on the property. 
Mr. Poulsen purchased the property for a truck and cash, having a total value of 
$12,000.00, received and recorded the warranty deed and took possession. There was 
nothing to alert him to a duty of injury about any claimed interests of appellant. She had 
long since gone to California and no lis pendens was of record and no decree of divorce 
relating to the realty or at all had been entered of record. 
Appellant says that the court in the divorce proceedings had retained jurisdiction of 
realty. Language may be found in the transcript of the divorce proceedings in the 
words, 'The Court reserves for future decision the decision as to property settlement of the 
parties either by stipulation or by a further hearing." (X-119). Nothing was of record to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alert an innocent purchaser for value. The "villain" in this piece appears to be the husband, 
who was the sole record owner of the realty and who sold such representing himself to be a 
single man. 
However, he probaably did so innocently, believing that after more than three months 
following the oral granting of a divorce to appellant, the divorce would be final. No one has 
placed in the record any excuse or justification for the four and one-half month lag in the 
preparation of the Findings and Decree for signing by Judge McCune. No agreement for 
division of the realty between appellant and her erstwhile husband has ever been filed or 
recorded. 
When the Decree was finally entered on April 14, 1973, it purported to award the 
property (standing in Mr. Hamilton's sole name) to the parties in some sort of unintelligible 
phrase, as the property had never been in joint tenancy nor co-tenancy, 
"6. That the following described real property should remain in joint ownership 
as tenants in common until the Court, by further Order, directs distribution or 
division of said property." 
However, at that time there was other real property in the name of the husband upon 
which the divorce decree could act. She had no interest in the presently involved property 
and he had fully divested himself of all right, title and interest by his warranty deed to 
George Poulsen. 
If this appears to appellant to be an unjust situation, think of how it would appear to 
respondents, the Poulsens, if they were to be divested of all or half of the property now. 
Appellant was represented by legal counsel and could have protected herself from this result 
by any of the following methods: 
(a) Filing a lis pendens at the inception of or during the course of the divorce 
proceedings. (Section 78-40-2 U.C.A. 1953); 
(b) Recording a homestead declaration, asserting an interest for herself and the 
children; (Section 28-1-10 U.C.A. 1953); 
(c) Staying in possession of the realty (such would be notice of her interest requiring 
a prospective purchaser to inquire and buy subject to rights of those in possession); or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(d) Filing a Notice of interest under the Marketable Title Statute (Sections 
57-9-4 and 57-9-5 U.C.A. 1953). 
Obviously, appellant and her then counsel could have insulated her against the problem 
now confronting her, had any one of the four courses been followed. These, by statute or 
by judicial decision, are each separately adequate to obviate any third party from becoming 
an innocent, bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of her interest. Appellant 
chose to do nothing to give notice to the world or to the Poulsens that she expected to 
procure a share in her husband's realty. 
Respondent George Poulsen bought part of the realty owned by Mr. Hamilton in good 
faith and for valuable consideration, fully believing Mr. Hamilton's representations that he 
was a single man. Respondent still has recourse against Mr. Hamilton and against the water 
stock and residue of the land. But, as against respondents Poulsen, she has no legal or 
equitable recourse. 
The trial court (Judge Burns) properly found against the appellant in this case. The 
consciousness of this finding and regrets in being impelled to make the same are evidenced 
by the court's expressions at the time of argument on the Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Then in the conclusions the court provided: 
D. This Court still has continuing jurisdiction for the administration of the other 
properties which were owned by the parties to the divorce action, consisting of 50 
acres of property and 50 shares of water stock, and of the defendant Robert Earl 
Hamilton in said divorce proceedings, to make such orders as may be just and 
equitable as between the plaintiff and said defendant and as to said remaining 
property. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING APPELLANT AS OPPOSED 
TO INNOCENT PURCHASER RESPONDENT. 
At page 5 of the appellant's brief we find, "it may be conceded that as a general 
rule a divorce terminates the wife's statutory interest." Certainly we agree with this. The 
"public policy" issues raised by appellant are in fact spurious. Divorce proceedings have Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
traditionally resulted in some award to the wife of some share of the realty. As this court 
has recently said, that is no fixed formula and the claim of one-third has no basis in law, 
but merely in custom. It was referred to as a "sort of dowered theory of one-third to 
woman and two-thirds to the man syndrom." Leftwich v. Leftwich, Utah case April 23, 
1976 (not yet reported). 
The basic rule as to division of properties as stated in Utah is found in Martinett v. 
Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P. 2d 821, is that the court should make such orders in 
relation to property ". . .as may be equitable." In Holder v. Holder Utah case, (May 6, 
1976 - not yet reported) the principle of continuing jurisdiction "of the parties" in a divorce 
proceeding to make changes and new orders as to "support and maintenance, or the 
distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary" was reaffirmed. 
In this very case, Judge Burns has sought to achieve this result. As quoted above, in 
paragraph " D " of the Conclusions of Law, supra, the Court announced its continuing 
jurisdiction "for the administration of other properties which were owned by the parties to 
the divorce action, consisting of 50 acres of property and 50 shares of water stock." The 
trial court may well award to appellant the entire ownership in the 50 acres and 50 shares of 
water stock. The realty bought by respondent Poulsen did not include any water stock. The 
court also has retained jurisdiction of appellant's husband, Robert E. Hamilton, for making 
further awards. 
Public policy favors an innocent purchaser of realty for value. The Utah legislature 
provided for the recording of deeds, encumbrances, etc. (Sect. 57-1-6 U.C.A. 1953) and 
said that recording is necessary to impart notice, this court has carved out the exceptions as 
to persons in possession and actual knowledge, Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 P. 2d 
454. Many Utah decisions are cited under this statute. Most recently this principle of notice 
by recording was pronounced by Wilson v. Schneider's Riverside Golf Course, 
Utah 2d , 523 P 2d 1226. 
The general principles of protection of respondents, Poulsen, as bona fide purchasers 
for value and without notice of appellant's claims, are stated at 77 Am. Jur 2d 754, 1633. 
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It has been declared that the soundest reasons of justice and policy demand 
that every reasonable intendment should be made to support the titles of bona 
fide purchasers of real property, and that no equity can be any stronger than 
that of a purchaser who has put himself in peril by purchasing a title for a 
valuable consideration without notice of any defect in it. . . . 
. . . .The protection accorded bona fide purchasers of real estate is ordinarily 
extended to purchasers acquiring a legal title. This principle falls within 
the maxim that "where equities are equal the law will prevail." 
Somehow the appellant would want the court to feel sorry for her as the divorced 
appellant and right the apparent indignities imposed by her ex-husband, by taking away half 
of respondent Poulsen's land. This theory is supplemented by a suggestion that the valuable 
consideration paid by respondent to Mr. Hamilton is "inadequate". Page 10 of the 
appellant's brief asserts that the purchase price was only one-third of the true value of the 
land. The court should know that such is not a fair or correct statement. 
The appraisal by Mr. Esplin was presented ex parte to the trial court and without 
cross-examination. His appraisal is found in the record (Q39-42). On the face of it we 
observe that the first item of appraisal was 50 share of Abraham Water, $6,250.00. This 
water was not sold to Mr. Poulsen. The next item on the appraisal is 86 acres of irrigated 
land at $200.00 per acre. Fifty acres of that land was not sold to Mr. Poulsen. Thus we must 
deduct $10,000.00 of land and $6,250.00 of water (available yet for award to appellant, 
according to Judge Burns' decision). This would leave values of $22,000.00 in land (but 
without any water) acquired by respondent Poulsen. However, the actual values are 
probably substantially less as affects the appellant, as may be seen from the following: 
(a) The entire property, including the water stock, all of the realty and some 
farming implements were purchased in November, 1967 (2-Vi years before) 
for $11,500.00 by Mr. Hamilton's father and given by him to Mr. Hamilton. 
(b) Mrs. Hamilton (appellant) said in her deposition That she and her 
husband were supposed to pay her father-in-law for the entire property 
$15,000.00 (p. 13) and that she and her husband had only paid $2,500.00 in 
the two years they had been in possession, leaving $12,500.00 yet to be 
paid by her. 
So, as between the appellant and the respondent there was not such a disparity of ' 
price. The $12,000.00 paid by respondents was the price fixed by Mr. Hamilton, who 
initiated the negotiations for sale and purchase of the land. Appellant could have protected 
herself by taking any of the four steps outlined above. She did not file a lis pendens, did not Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
remain in possession, did not record a homestead declaration nor a declaration of interest. 
If equities are to be balanced, the appellant herself does not come before the court with 
clean hands. She must be estopped from asserting her claims against an innocent, bona fide 
purchaser for value. So long as a substantial consideration has been paid, the court is not 
concerned with the actual number of dollars. 
Lastly, the appellant identifies Section 76-20-10 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. This is in the 
Criminal Code and makes it a felony for a married man to falsely represent himself as 
unmarried. Certainly the thrust of this statute is to impose criminal sanctions against Mr. 
Hamilton, the appellant's ex-husband. The legislature well knew that by deceptive activities, 
a husband could deprive the wife of her hoped-for inchoate share in family realty by 
conveying as a "single man" realty standing solely in his name to a bona fide purchaser for 
value such as respondent Poulsen. To dissuade married men from such activities, the felony 
statute was adopted. 
The long arm of the criminal law can reach out and punish Mr. Hamilton for this, we 
suppose. We know of no efforts on the part of Mrs. Hamilton (appellant) to file a criminal 
action against him. Surely the affirmation by this court of the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment as entered by Judge Burns will not * 'encourage violation of the criminal code" as 
contended by appellant. 
Never have we understood that the Supreme Court of Utah was subjecting itself to that 
type of unjust accusation by merely doing its duty in affirming a proper order of the lower 
court. It appers to be most unfair for appellant to charge this Court with encouraging 
violation of the criminal code of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
We must strenuously urge this court to affirm the judgment of the lower court. 
Stability of legal titles on realty are of importance to the economy and social structure in 
Utah. Were this title to the land to be overturned at the behest of an ex-wife who has failed 
to take the reasonable and necessary steps to protect her possible interests, then many titles 
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to realty will be suspect and all which pass through a "single man" grantor will be 
challenged. 
Appellant still has recourse as to the water stock and other land and against her former 
husband. The gross investment which she and her husband had in the property was 
$2,500.00. Title never was in her name. She is not the widow of the title holder. The realty 
was sold to respondent Poulsen, while still vested in Mr. Hamilton, and Poulsen was an 
innocent bona fide purchaser for value. The divorce decree, when entered a month later, 
could not and did not act on the title to realty already conveyed. Appellant has failed to 
show any valid basis for reversal of Judge Burns' decision. 
Respectfully submitted 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
Attorney for Respondents Poulsen 
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